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We analyze the optimal design of monetary rules. We suppose there is an agreed upon social welfare
function that depends on the randomly ﬂuctuating state of the economy and that the monetary
authority has private information about that state. We suppose the government can constrain the
policies of the monetary authority by legislating a rule. In general, well-designed rules trade-oﬀ
the need to constrain policymakers from the standard time consistency problem arising from the
temptation for unexpected inﬂation with the desire to give them ﬂexibility to react to their private
information. Surprisingly, we show that for a wide variety of circumstances the optimal rule gives
the monetary authority no ﬂexibility. This rule can be interpreted as a strict inﬂation targeting
rule where the target is a prespeciﬁed function of publicly observed data. In this sense, optimal
monetary policy is transparent.
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Reserve System.Beginning with Kydland and Prescott (1977), there has been a long debate over the
question of how tightly should rules constrain the discretion of the monetary authority in
setting monetary policy. In practice, in the United States, the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) does not articulate a plan for monetary policy as a simple function of publicly
observed data, nor does it explain its past actions as a simple function of past data. One
motivation for this ambiguity is that the committee wants to preserve the ﬂexibility to react
to private information it has about the state of the economy at its discretion. Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986) provide a formal rationale for such ambiguity. A number of economists argue
that better outcomes would be achieved if the FOMC set monetary policy as a simple function
of observed data. They argue that by so doing the committee can improve the transparency
its actions and that this transparency can increase welfare even when the cost of the rule in
terms of diminished ﬂexibility for the monetary authority is taken into account. (See, among
others, Goodfriend 1986, Bernanke and Mishkin 1997, Blinder 1997 and Svensson and Faust
2000.)
We address the question of how tightly rules for monetary policy should constrain
the decisions of the monetary authority by building on an insightful paper by Canzoneri
(1985). In it he asks the question: How should the government legislate rules to constrain
the policies of the monetary authority when the monetary authority has private information
about the economy? One option is for the government to set rules that only loosely constrain
the decisions of the monetary authority, leaving it the ﬂexibility to change policy in response
to its private information. Another option is for the government to set rules for monetary
policy that tightly constrain these decisions, leaving the monetary authority little room to
change policy in response to its private information. Canzoneri discusses the pros and consof several simple types of rules. These rules trade-oﬀ the need to constrain policymakers
from the standard time consistency problem arising from the temptation to stimulate the
economy with a surprise inﬂation with the desire to give them ﬂexibility to react to their
private information. He argues that while it is most interesting to solve for the optimal rule
for monetary policy, it is extremely diﬃc u l ta n da no p e np r o b l e m .
The point of this paper is to answer the question posed by Canzoneri, namely to ﬁnd
the rule for monetary policy that optimally trades oﬀ these needs and desires. We consider
a simple model of the monetary policy similar to that of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983). There is an agreed-upon social welfare function that depends
on the random state of the economy. At one extreme, if the state is observed equally well
by both private agents and the monetary authority, then there is no tension between time
consistency and ﬂexibility: the government can legislate an optimal rule for monetary policy
as a function of publicly observed data and leave the monetary authority no ﬂexibility in
implementing that rule.
We analyze the opposite extreme, one in which the monetary authority observes the
state exactly and private agents have no direct information about the state. Here there is
a tension. A rule with less ﬂexibility mitigates the time consistency problem in which the
monetary authority is tempted to claim repeatedly that its information about the current
state of the economy justiﬁes a monetary stimulus to output, but such a rule has the cost of
leaving little room for the monetary authority to ﬁne tune its policy to its private information.
Ar u l ew i t hm o r eﬂexibility lets the monetary authority ﬁne tune its policy but allows more
room for the monetary authority to stimulate the economy with a surprise inﬂation.
We consider rules for monetary policy that set the range of inﬂation rates that can
2be chosen by the monetary authority as a function of publicly observed data. We interpret
these rules as inﬂation targets. As discussed by Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), in practice,
inﬂation targets often take the form of ranges of acceptable inﬂation rates. Rules with wide
ranges of acceptable inﬂation allow more ﬂexibility while those with narrow ranges allow less
ﬂexibility. These rules for monetary policy, once set, determine the rules of the game played
by the monetary authority in setting monetary policy and private agents in the economy.
We solve for the optimal rule for setting monetary policy namely, the one that, in
equilibrium, leads to the highest level of social welfare. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that, under a
large set of circumstances, the optimal rule for monetary policy leaves no discretion at all for
the monetary authority to vary policy in response to its private information about the state
of the economy. That is, the optimal rule for monetary policy lays down precise guidelines
for monetary policy as a simple function of publicly observed data and leaves no room for
ﬂexibility whatsoever. We argue that this rule can be interpreted as a strict inﬂation targeting
rule where the target is a prespeciﬁed function of publicly observed data.
More formally our model can be described as follows. Each period, the monetary
authority observes one of N possible privately observed states of the economy denoted θi.
These states are i.i.d. over time. With full commitment, the monetary authority would prefer
to choose higher inﬂa t i o nw h e nh i g h e rv a l u e so ft h i ss t a t ea r er e a l i z e da n dl o w e ri n ﬂation when
lower values of this state are realized. The incentive problem arises because the state of the
economy is not publicly observed. A rule for monetary policy is an interval of inﬂation rates
that constrains the range of inﬂation rates that the monetary authority is allowed to choose.
In this sense, this rule sets the feasible actions available to the monetary authority in the
repeated game that is then played between the monetary authority and the public.
3We use standard recursive techniques to analyze this repeated game. In it payoﬀsa r e
the sum of the payoﬀ from current actions and a continuation payoﬀ reﬂecting the discounted
value of payoﬀs from next period on. To maximize current period payoﬀs the monetary au-
thority would like to stimulate the economy with a surprise inﬂation. Thus, for a ﬂexible
monetary policy to be incentive compatible it must be that if the monetary authority chooses
ah i g h e rr a t eo fi n ﬂation in the current period it must receive a correspondingly lower contin-
uation value from next period on. The lower continuation payoﬀ occurs because the higher
inﬂation in the current period leads agents to expect inﬂation in future periods and hence set
their wages correspondingly high. We think of this lower continuation value as reﬂecting a
reduction in the credibility of the monetary authority. In contrast, if the monetary authority
is allowed no ﬂexibility in setting monetary policy there is no incentive compatibility problem
and continuation payoﬀs can all be the same and as high as possible. Hence, in designing the
optimal rule for monetary policy there is a tradeoﬀ between ﬂexibility and credibility.
We ﬁnd that under a wide variety of circumstances the gains from ﬂexibility are out-
weighed by the costs of lost credibility. The key to this result lies in the incentive compatibility
constraints. These constraints require that the monetary policy be structured so that when
given state θi is realized, the monetary authority be indiﬀerent between reporting the true
state θi and claiming instead that the state is the next higher one θi+1. Thus, if the policy is
to allow the monetary authority to choose higher inﬂa t i o nw h e ns t a t eθi+1 is realized than it
does when state θi is realized, then at the higher state θi+1 this policy must trade oﬀ current
inﬂation against future payoﬀs at the marginal rate of substitution of the authority at the
lower state θi, not at its true, higher, marginal rate of substitution. In this way, incentive
compatibility requires that any policy with ﬂexibility trades oﬀ this ﬂexibility and credibility
4in an ineﬃcient manner. We use this logic to show that the optimal policy must specify that
monetary policy be independent of the private information of the monetary authority.
In terms of the literature on monetary policy, our paper is most closely related to that
of Canzoneri (1985). It is also related to the work of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and
Faust and Svensson (2000). At a technical level it is draws on the literature on recursive
approaches to dynamic games. We use the techniques of Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1991)
and use insights related to those in the work of Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchiricho (2000).
1. The economy
Time is discrete. There is one government, one monetary authority, and a continuum
of agents. In period 0, the government chooses an inﬂation target zone that is described by
bounds on inﬂation rates that the monetary authority can choose. (See Bernanke and Mishkin
1997 for a discussion of how, in practice, inﬂation targets are typically speciﬁed as ranges).
It then delegates the job of setting monetary policy within these bounds to the monetary
authority. We interpret the government as allowing more or less ﬂexibility for the monetary
authority depending on the gap between the upper and lower bounds on inﬂation imposed in
the inﬂation targets. The monetary authority and the agents then play an inﬁnitely repeated
game in which monetary policy is constrained by the bounds chosen by the government.
Consider the following game. At the beginning of each period, agents choose individual
action zt from some compact set. We interpret z as (the growth rate of) nominal wages. We
let xt denote the average nominal wage. Next, the monetary authority observes the current
realization of its private information θt. This private information θt is an i.i.d. mean 0 random
variable with support θ ∈ {θ0,,...,θN} with p(θ) denoting the probability of θ.T h e n t h e




where µ and ¯ µ are the bounds imposed
by the inﬂation target zone chosen by the government once-and-for-all in period 0.
The monetary authority maximizes a social welfare function that depends on unem-
ployment, inﬂation, and its private information θ. Each period, inﬂation πt is equal to the
money growth rate µt chosen by the monetary authority. Unemployment is determined by a
Phillips curve. The unemployment rate is given by
ut = U + xt − µt (1)
where x is the average of z across agents and U is a positive constant, which we interpret as
the natural rate of unemployment. Social welfare in period t is a function of ut and πt and
the unobserved state θt. Our leading example will be the Kydland and Prescott objective
function which has the form
−u
2
t/2 − (πt − θt)
2/2. (2)
Using (1) and πt = µt we can write this objective function in terms of nominal wage growth





(U + xt − µt)




In our example the private information is about the inﬂation target.
We develop our model for general speciﬁcations of the social welfare function R(xt,µ t,θt)
which imply (3) as a special case. In the general setup, we interpret θt to be private informa-
tion of the monetary authority regarding the impact of a monetary stimulus on social welfare
in the current period.
6A. Two Ramsey benchmarks
In what follows we will be interested in a game in which the monetary authority cannot




imposed by the inﬂation target
zone set by the government in period 0. Before analyzing this game it is useful to consider
two alternative games with commitment that we think of as benchmarks.
Our ﬁrst benchmark, the Ramsey policy,d e n o t e dµR(θ), yields the highest payoﬀ that
c a nb ea c h i e v e de v e nw i t hc o m m i t m e n t . T h eg a pb e t w e e nt h ea s s o c i a t e dR a m s e yp a y o ﬀ
and the payoﬀ in the game without commitment measures the welfare loss of the lack of
commitment.
Our second benchmark, the expected Ramsey policy, denoted µER, is the optimal policy
of the monetary authority when it can commit once-and-for-all to a monetary policy that is
independent of its private information. This policy is a useful benchmark because in the game
without commitment the government can ensure that it implements the expected Ramsey
policy as an equilibrium by choosing an inﬂation target zone that imposes the expected
R a m s e ym o n e yg r o w t hr a t ew i t hn oﬂexibility: µ =¯ µ = µER. We use this benchmark in
proving our main result, namely it is optimal for the government to choose an inﬂation target
zone that imposes the expected Ramsey policy with no ﬂexibility.
For the Ramsey benchmark consider a game with commitment with the following
timing scheme. Before the realization of its type, the monetary authority commits to a
schedule for money growth rates µ(θ) indicating what money growth rate will be implemented
once its type is realized. Next, private agents choose their nominal wages z with associated
average nominal wages x. Then the government’s type θ is privately realized and money












For our example (3), the Ramsey policy is µR(θ)=θ. Note that the Ramsey policy has the
monetary authority choosing a money growth rate that is increasing in its type, and thus,
with full commitment, it is optimal to allow the monetary authority ﬂexibility in choosing
monetary policy to reﬂect its private information. This feature of the environment leads to
t e n s i o ni nt h er e p e a t e dg a m eb e t w e e nﬂexibility and credibility.
For the second benchmark, consider a variant of this game in which the monetary
authority is restricted to choosing a money growth µ that does not vary with its type. This
equilibrium allocations and policies in this game solve the expected Ramsey problem
v







Let µER denote the expected Ramsey policy. For our example (3), the expected Ramsey
policy is µER =0 .
Clearly, for our example (3), the Ramsey policy yields strictly higher welfare than the




8the Ramsey policy µR(θ) is strictly increasing in θ and the Ramsey policy yields strictly
higher welfare than the expected Ramsey policy.
B. The repeated game







speciﬁes the money growth rate chosen by the monetary authority in period
t following history ht =( µ0,µ 1,...,µ t), and the current realization of the private information
θt.
Each period, each agent chooses the action zt as a function of the history of money
growth rates ht. We assume that each agent’s objective is to choose nominal wage growth
equal to expected inﬂation. Taking monetary policy µt(ht,θt) as given, consumers set zt(ht)














where the future histories ht are recursively generated from the choice of monetary policy
µt(ht,θt) in the natural way, starting from the null history. The term (1 − β) normalizes the
discounted payoﬀs to be in the same units as the per-period payoﬀs.




, is a monetary policy {µt (ht,θt)}
∞
t=0 , a strategy for wage setting by agents {zt (ht)}
∞
t=0 ,
and average wages {xt (ht)}
∞
t=0 such that (6) is satisﬁed in every period following every history
9ht, average wages equal individual wages in that xt(ht)=zt(ht), and the monetary policy is
incentive compatible in the standard sense that, in every period, following every history ht
and realization of the private information θt, the monetary authority prefers to choose money





since average wages xt(ht) always equal wages of individual agents zt(ht), we need only record
average wages from now on.
C. A recursive formulation
Here we formulate the problem of characterizing the set of (perfect Bayesian) equilib-
rium payoﬀs of our repeated game recursively along the lines of Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti
(1991).
The basic idea is the following. Since there are no physical state variables the set
of equilibrium payoﬀs that can be obtained from any period t on is the same that can be
obtained from period 0. Thus, the payoﬀ to any equilibrium strategies for the repeated game
c a nb eb r o k e nd o w ni n t op a y o ﬀs from current actions for the players and continuation payoﬀs
that are themselves drawn from the set of equilibrium payoﬀs. Following this logic, Abreu,
Pearce and Stachetti (1991) show that the set of equilibrium payoﬀs can be found using a
recursive method.
In our environment, this recursive method is as follows. Consider an operator on
sets of the following form. Let W b es o m ec o m p a c ts u b s e to ft h er e a ll i n ea n dw and ¯ w
be the smallest and largest element of W respectively. The set W may be interpreted as
a candidate set of equilibrium payoﬀs levels of social welfare. In our recursive formulation
the current actions are average wages x and a choice of money growth µ(θ) for every realized
10value of the state θ. The continuation payoﬀs represent the discounted utility for the monetary
authority from next period on and are denoted by w(µ). These payoﬀsd e p e n do nt h ep u b l i c l y
observable action µ of the monetary authority. Clearly, these payoﬀsc a n n o tv a r yd i r e c t l yw i t h
the privately observed state θ. Moreover, it is easy to show, along the lines of Chari and Kehoe
(1992), that it is superﬂous to let these payoﬀs depend on the actions x of the private agents.




, and function w(µ) are enforceable by W if,





and the incentive constraints
(1 − β)R(x,µ(θ),θ)+βw(µ(θ)) ≥ (1 − β)R(x, ˆ µ,θ)+βw(ˆ µ) (10)




. Constraint (8) requires that each continuation payoﬀ w(µ)
be drawn from the set of candidate equilibrium payoﬀs W while constraint (9) requires that
average wages equal expected inﬂation. Constraint (10) requires that for each privately
observed state θ, the monetary authority prefer its money growth rate µ(θ) and continuation
value w(µ(θ)) rather than a money growth rate ˆ µ and corresponding continuation value w(ˆ µ).
We ﬁnd it useful to simplify the incentive constraint (10) as follows. In the current
period, given a speciﬁed set of current actions µ(θ0),...,µ(θN) and a current realized state
θ, there are two types of potential deviations ˆ µ by the monetary authority: undetectable
deviations and detectable deviations. In an undetectable deviation, the monetary authority
chooses a money growth rate speciﬁed for some other privately observed state. That is, in
state θ it chooses
ˆ µ ∈ {µ(θ0),...,µ(θN)}. (11)
11but ˆ µ 6= µ(θ). In this type of deviation the monetary authority is eﬀectively misrepresenting
the true state of the economy and the incentive constraint can be written
(1 − β)R(x,µ(θ),θ)+βw(µ(θ)) ≥ (1 − β)R(x,µ(ˆ θ),θ)+βw(µ(ˆ θ)) (12)
for all ˆ θ.
In a detectable deviation the monetary authority chooses some money growth rate not
equal to any of those speciﬁed for any of the states. That is, it chooses
ˆ µ/ ∈ {µ(θ0),...,µ(θN)}. (13)
For any such growth rate, private agents know for sure that the monetary authority has
deviated. It should be clear that a detectable deviation can be deterred by some continuation
payoﬀs w(ˆ µ) ∈ W, if and only if it it can be deterred by the lowest possible continuation payoﬀ
w(ˆ µ)=w. Using this logic we write the incentive constraint for undetectable deviations as
(1 − β)R(x,µ(θ),θ)+βw(θ) ≥ (1 − β)R(x, ˆ µ,θ)+βw (14)









[(1 − β)R(x,µ(θ),θ)+βw(θ)]p(θ) (15)
Deﬁne the operator T that maps sets so payoﬀs W into new sets of payoﬀs T(W) according
to
T(W)={Π(x,µ(θ),w(θ))|x,µ(θ),w(θ) are enforceable by W}. (16)
As demonstrated by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti, the set of equilibrium payoﬀsi st h el a r g e s t




12For any given set of candidate equilibrium payoﬀs W, we are interested in ﬁnding the
largest payoﬀ that is enforceable by W, namely, the largest element ¯ v ∈ T(W). We ﬁnd this
payoﬀ by solving the following problem, termed the best payoﬀ problem,




[(1 − β)R(x,µ(θ),θ)+βw(µ(θ))]p(θ) (18)
subject to constraints x, µ(θ), and w(µ) are enforceable by W, in that they satisfy (8), (9),
(12), and (14).
When we solve this problem with W = W∗, (17) implies that the resulting payoﬀ is the
highest equilibrium payoﬀ. We refer to this equilibrium as the best equilibrium and denote
its payoﬀ as ¯ w∗.
2. The optimality of transparent policy
In this section we show the optimal inﬂation target zone requires that the monetary
authority follows the expected Ramsey policy with no ﬂexiblity. This result means that
optimal monetary policy is transparent in the sense that it depends only on publicly observed
information.
We proceed as follows. We begin with some technical assumptions on the probabilities
of various unobserved states and conditions on the payoﬀ function. We then consider a version
of the best payoﬀ problem in which we relax a number of constraints. We show that for this
relaxed problem the optimal policy for any given W does not vary with the unobserved state.
We argue that the optimal policy for the relaxed problem is feasible for the original problem
and hence solves the original problem for any given W. Since the equilibrium set of payoﬀs
solves this best problem for some particular set W∗, the optimal equilibrium policy does not
13vary with the unobserved state either. This establishes that optimal policy depends only on
publicly observed information.
We make the following assumptions. We assume that the values of θi,i=0 ,1,...,Nin
the support of the monetary authority’s private information are equally spaced. To simplify
the notation, we let µi = µ(θi) and wi = w(µ(θi)) and refer to i as the type of the monetary
authority. Recall that this type changes every period and is i.i.d. across periods. Let the
probabilities of type i being realized in any period be pi and the c.d.f.’s be Pi =
Pi
j=0 pi. We







for all i. Assumption (A1) is a monotone hazard condition.






R(x,µ,θi) for all i,x and µ. (A2)















for all i whenever µ0 ≥ µ, which essentially requires that third derivatives are negative.
Finally, we assume that
∂
∂µ
R(x,µ,θi) > 0 (A4)
for all x and µ in [µ, ¯ µ] and for all i. This assumption guarantees the current period payoﬀs
are always increasing in unanticipated inﬂation. This will imply that in the game the mon-
etary authority is always tempted to stimulate the economy with a surprise inﬂation. It is
14immediate to check that the Kydland-Prescott example (3) satisﬁes assumptions (A2) and
(A3). It satisﬁes assumption (A4) if U ≥ 2¯ µ − µ − θ−1.
In the relaxed problem we will replace the incentive constraints with the weaker con-
dition that the policy µi be increasing in the type. We do so based on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. (Discrete single crossing implies monotonicity) Under (A2), any incentive
compatible allocation has µi+1 ≥ µi
Proof. Incentive compatibility requires
(1 − β)R(x,µi,θi+1)+βwi ≤ (1 − β)R(x,µi+1,θi+1)+βwi+1 (19)
(1 − β)R(x,µi,θi)+βwi ≥ (1 − β)R(x,µi+1,θi)+βwi+1 (20)
From (19)
(1 − β)[R(x,µi+1,θi+1) − R(x,µi,θi+1)] ≥ β(wi − wi+1) (21)
(1 − β)[R(x,µi+1,θi) − R(x,µi,θi)] ≤ β(wi − wi+1) (22)
These inequalities together imply
R(x,µi+1,θi+1) − R(x,µi,θi+1) ≥ R(x,µi+1,θi) − R(x,µi,θi) (23)
Notice that (A2) implies
R(x,µ
0,θi+1) − R(x,µ,θi+1) >R (x,µ
0,θi) − R(x,µ,θi) for each i and µ
0 >µ
R(x,µ
0,θi+1) − R(x,µ,θi+1) <R (x,µ
0,θi) − R(x,µ,θi) for each i and µ
0 <µ .
Hence, under (A2), (23) implies µi+1 ≥ µi. Q.E.D.
15Note that under (A4) any incentive compatible allocation also has wi+1 ≤ wi.
Consider a version of the best payoﬀ problem in which we impose that the monetary
policy µi be non-decreasing in type i,we impose only a subset of the incentive constraints
for undetectable deviations (12), we omit the incentive constraints for detectable deviations
(14), and we replace the constraints wi ∈ W for with simply wi ≤ ¯ wi=0 ,...,N.. We refer





pi [(1 − β)R(x,µi,θi)+βwi] (24)
subject to constraints





µi ≤ µi+1 (27)
(1 − β)R(x,µi,θi)+βwi ≥ (1 − β)R(x,µi+1,θi)+βwi+1 (28)
for all i =0 ,1,...,N.
We ﬁrst show that the optimal policy for the relaxed problem does not vary with the
unobserved state θi.
Proposition 1. Under (A1)-(A4), the optimal monetary policy in the relaxed problem
is independent of the unobserved state, so µ0 = ...= µN.
Proof. We prove the proposition with a variational argument. Assume, by way of
contradiction, that for some i =0 ,...,N, µ i <µ i+1. Consider the following variation:
increase µi by ∆µi and decrease µi+1 by ∆µi+1 = −pi∆µi/pi+1, h o l da l lo t h e rm o n e yg r o w t h
16rates at their original levels, and let the continuation values wi be adjusted so at to change
the left and right hand sides of the incentive constraints (28) equally, thus ensuring the
variations satisﬁes these constraints. Under this variation expected inﬂation is unchanged
since ∆x = pi∆µi + pi+1∆µi+1 =0 . By design, the incentive constraints will continue to
be satisﬁed. By showing that this variation is feasible and improves welfare we show the
contradiction that establishes our result.
It is helpful to write the impact of this variation on expected utility in two parts. The
ﬁr s tp a r ti st h a td u et or a i s i n gµi by ∆µi, for a constant x. We choose ∆wi to hold ﬁxed the
right-side of type i − 10s incentive constraint (28). Thus,




Note (A4) implies that ∆wi is negative and hence (25) is satisﬁed. This combination of ∆µi
and ∆wi raises type i0s discounted utility by







which by assumption (A2) is positive. Intuitively, this variation trades oﬀ higher inﬂation
for lower continuation utility for type i at the marginal rate of substitution of the lower type
i−1. The single crossing assumption implies that higher types have higher marginal rates of
substitution and thus type i gains from this trade.
To keep the incentive constraints unchanged for types i +1and higher we raise their
continuation utilities by ∆Ui. To see that this part of the variation satisﬁes (25), recall that
incentive compatibility for type i +1requires that
(1 − β)[R(x,µi+1,θi+1) − R(x,µi,θi+1)] ≥ β(wi − wi+1). (31)
17Hence µi+1 >µ i and (A4) implies that wi >w i+1. Since µj ≥ µj−1 it follows that wi >w i+1 ≥
wj for all j ≥ i +2 . Thus, since wi ≤ ¯ w so is wj for all j ≥ i and so (25) is satisﬁed.




The second part of the variation is that due to lowering µi+1 by ∆µi+1, for a given x.
We choose the increment to the continuation utility for type i+1to keep the right-hand side
of the incentive constraint for type i unchanged. Thus the incremental impact of this part of
the variation on the utility of type i +1is







which by assumption (A2) is negative. This variation trades oﬀ lower inﬂation for higher
continuation utility for type i+1at the marginal rate of substitution of the lower type i. To
keep the incentive constraints unchanged for types i+2and higher we lower their continuation
utilities by ∆Ui+1. This variation clearly satisﬁes (25).




Since ∆µi+1 = −pi∆µi/pi+1 we can write the total change in utility, the sum of (32) and



















Assumption (A1) is that (1 − Pi−1)/pi > (1 − Pi)/pi+1. Assumption (A3), together with













18Hence, (35) is positive.
Thus, if µi <µ i+1 for some i =1 ,...,N there is a feasible variation that improves
the objective. This is a contradiction and hence, at the solution to the relaxed problem
µ0 = ...= µN. Q.E.D.
The following proposition is then immediate.
Proposition 2. Under (A1)-(A4), the expected Ramsey value vER is an upper bound
on the best equilibrium value ¯ w∗. The government can uniquely implement the best equilib-
rium value by requiring that the monetary authority choose the expected Ramsey policy in
each period by setting µ =¯ µ = µER.
Proof. We have shown that in the relaxed problem it is optimal to have the money
growth rate independent of the type. By construction, the expected Ramsey payoﬀ is the
highest payoﬀ that can be achieved with a monetary policy that is independent of type.
Hence, the best equilibrium value ¯ w∗ is necessarily less than or equal to the expected Ramsey
payoﬀ vER.
If the government sets the inﬂation target zone to be the single point µER then there
are no incentive problems arising from the choice of money growth and all of the dropped












By choosing ¯ µ = µ = µER the government then uniquely implements the expected Ramsey
policies and payoﬀs. Q.E.D.
193. Conclusion
How should the rules governing the conduct of monetary policy be set? We have
argued that optimal rules tightly constrain the discretion of the monetary authority. This
rule speciﬁes that monetary policy not react to the private information of the monetary
authority. In our simple setting there is no publicly observed state and hence the optimal
rule speciﬁes a constant inﬂation rate. If we extended the model to have a publicly observed
state then the optimal rule would respond to this state but not to the private information.
To achieve this the government would specify a rule for setting monetary policy a function
of public information, with no room for discretion. We interpret this rule as a strict inﬂation
targeting rule speciﬁed as a function of observables.
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